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CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PRIVATE




Euphemia Donahue, a minority stockholder' in The Rodd
Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., brought suit against
the company, its directors, and Harry C. Rodd, a previous director,
officer and the company's controlling shareholder. The plaintiff
sought rescission of a July, 1970 transaction, in which the company
purchased forty-five shares of its own stock2 from Harry C. Rodd,
at eight hundred dollars (US) per share, totalling thirty-six thou-
sand dollars (US).
In March 1971, Ms. Donahue learned of the purchase for the
first time at a special meeting of company stockholders where the
president and general manager reported generally on company
events of the previous year. The plaintiff voted against a resolution
adopting the president's report, and a few weeks later offered her
shares to the corporation on the same terms given to Harry C.
Rodd. The corporation refused to buy the shares, and Ms.
Donahue filed suit.
The Superior Court of Middlesex County, dismissed the suit
and Ms. Donahue appealed. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts
affirmed, and granted leave for further appeal. Ms. Donahue ap-
pealed finally to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.'
* M.A., LL,M (Lond.), Barrister; Associate Professor of Law, De Paul University,
College of Law. Research assistance by Mr. Mark MacDonald in the preparation of the final
draft of this article is gratefully acknowledged.
1. She held twenty percent of the outstanding shares.
2. Purchase by a company of its own shares is perfectly legal and is the norm in the
United States. In England, however, Companies Act, 1948, ch. 38 § 54, except as specified,
expressly prohibits companies from purchasing their own shares or providing any financial
assistance for such purchases. Instone, Section 54 and All That, 1980 J. Bus. L. 99.
3. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328
N.E.2d 505 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Donahue]. Followed in Cain v. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650
(Mass.App.Ct. 1976); 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J.Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78
(Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 47, 374 A.2d 1222 (App.Div. 1977); Wilkes v. Spring-
side Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc.,
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The court reversed the dismissal, and remanded the case for entry
of judgment in favor of the plaintiff." In holding for Ms. Donahue,
the court decided that:
[blecause of the fundamental resemblance of the close corpora-
tion to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are es-
sential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold
that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another sub-
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter-
prise that partners owe to one another.5
Furthermore, the authorized purchase of Mr. Rodd's shares by the
corporation, without providing minority stockholders with an equal
opportunity to sell shares to the corporation on the same terms,
was held to be a breach of that fiduciary duty.
This case should be viewed as a beachhead of progress in the
specific area of fiduciary duties owed among the shareholders in
small companies. This decision is potentially useful and should be
followed in other jurisdictions in the United States, as well as the
courts in the Common Law Commonwealth, but not, however, in
England. The approach adopted by the Massachusetts court may
be contrasted with the approach of the Chancery Division of the
High Court of England in Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd.6
In Clemens, the plaintiff, Miss P.D. Clemens, was a minority
395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1981). Explained in Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 423, 430, 560 P.2d
1091, 1094 (1977): "We do not believe, however, that the protective approach taken in [Don-
ahue] would require the corporation to tailor its policies to favor a minority shareholder at
the expense of the majority .... That, however, is apparently what plaintiff is seeking in
the present case." Rejected in Clagett v. Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978):
"The district court distinguished ... Donahue . .. and held that the Maryland courts
would not adopt the [Donahue] rule. We agree."
The decision has been viewed with some apparent trepidation because it does not an-
swer the questions that can arise from taking this juridical step. See 89 HAR. L. REv. 423
(1975); 21 VILL. L. REv. 307 (1976). This is, however, predictable because new ideas usually
have an initial apprehensive impact. The completed picture often requires years of judicial
and academic development to take its final shape.
4. On remand, the Massachusetts Superior Court was directed to either: (1) rescind the
purchase transaction between Harry C. Rodd and Rodd Electrotype Company [hereinafter
referred to as R.E.C.] for the forty-five shares; or (2) order R.E.C. to purchase all of Ms.
Donahue's forty-five shares in R.E.C. for the same price that it paid Harry C. Rodd. Dona-
hue, 367 Mass. at 603, 328 N.E.2d at 521.
5. Id. at 592-93, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
6. [1976] 2 AII.E.R. 268. Noted in 92 LAW Q. REv. 502 (1976). Noted and criticized in
40 MoD. L. Rav. 71 (1977), 35 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 235 (1976).
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shareholder 7 in a private family company, in which her aunt was
the only other shareholder. The articles of association conferred a
right of preemption upon the other company shareholders, if any
shareholder proposed to transfer company shares. The aunt was
one of five company directors, but the plaintiff, however, was not.
The directors decided to increase the company's share capital by
creating one thousand six hundred fifty ordinary shares with vot-
ing rights. Two hundred shares were to be issued to each of the
four other directors and the remaining eight hundred fifty were to
be placed in trust for long service employees of the company.
When notified by the company secretary of the proposals, and
the calling of an extraordinary general meeting for their implemen-
tation, the plaintiff, through her solicitor, wrote to her aunt oppos-
ing the scheme.' Her aunt replied that she supported the plan and
was fully aware of its effects.
At the meeting, the plaintiff, through her proxy, proposed an
adjournment which her aunt opposed, allowing the three resolu-
tions implementing the plan to pass. Thereupon, the plaintiff
brought suit in the Chancery Division of the High Court against
the company and her aunt, seeking a declaration that the resolu-
tions were oppressive to the plaintiff and requesting the court to
set them aside.
The High Court held that in the circumstances of this case,
the aunt's majority votes were subject to equitable principles
which prohibited the exercise of her control in a manner unjust to
the plaintiff. The effect of the resolutions would be to give com-
plete control to the aunt and the other directors, thereby depriving
the plaintiff of her existing rights,' and greatly reducing her future
prospects of gaining control of the company under article 6 of the
company's articles of association. 0 The Court, therefore, ordered
7. She held forty-five percent of the issued share capital, her aunt held the remaining
fifty-five percent. The capital of the company consisted of 200 preference shares (each held
100), and 1800 ordinary shares (the plaintiff held 800, her aunt 1000).
8. The letter pointed out that the plaintiff's shareholding would be reduced to less than
twenty-five percent.
9. If the plaintiff's degree of control was reduced from forty-five percent to less than
twenty-five percent, she would be deprived of her "negative control", i.e., the voting power
to block passage of special or extraordinary resolutions.
10. Because the new shares were issued, the plaintiff would need to purchase more than
twenty-five percent of the total company's shares in order to gain control. Whereas before
such issue, plaintiff need only have purchased just over five percent of the company's total
shares in order to gain control of the company.
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that the three resolutions be set aside.
Unlike the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the High Court did
not generalize its holding to establish a generic principle applicable
to private companies as a whole. Adopting its typical judicial ap-
proach, the High Court limited itself to a solution of the problem
before it, based upon well established equitable principles. Fur-
ther, the recent enactment of the Companies Act, 1980,11 precludes
English courts from developing equitable principles applicable to
private companies and, hence, from articulating a general
principle.
It is, however, readily accepted that many small companies do
function in a manner quite similar to partnerships.' In addition, it
is well established that the primary reasons for incorporation are
to allow shareholders to benefit from limited liability"8 and tax ad-
vantages, including the accumulation of tax free pension funds.'4
Contrasted with publicly held corporations, there is essentially no
public interest in the principles governing small corporations
which resemble partnerships. Hence, the interests of the members
of these small corporations should predominate. In other words,
public interest is neutral with respect to the application or nonap-
plication of publicly held corporation principles rather than part-
11. COMPANIES ACT, 1980. See I THE COMPANY LAWYER, 135, 190, 233, 280 (1980).
12. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (1957) (per Burger, J., now Chief Justice
Burger) (court footnotes omitted):
In an intimate business venture such as this, stockholders of a close corporation
occupy a position similar to that of joint adventurers and partners. While courts
have sometimes declared [that] stockholders 'do not bear toward each other that
same relation of trust and confidence which prevails in partnerships', this view
ignores the practical realities of the organization and functioning of a small
"two-man" corporation organized to carry on a small business enterprise in
which the stockholders, directors, and managers are the same persons.
See also Yenidje Tobacco Company, Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 426, 432 (per Cozens-Hardy, L.J.):
"[I] think the circumstances are such that we ought to apply, if necessary, the analogy of
the partnership law. . . to. . .this company. .. ; Comment, 61 IowA L. REv. 876, 881-882
(1976) (footnotes omitted):
This similitude, the court noted, in the second step of its analysis [of Donahue]
finds support from three sources, the commentators, the courts, and Congress,
all of which have noted that often the close corporation is little more than an
"incorporated partnership" in terms of the parties' expectations and the treat-
ment accorded the enterprise by outsiders.
13. PALMER'S COMPANY LAW, ch. 2 (21st ed. 1968); L. GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW
chs. 2, 3 (3d ed. 1969).
14. Kalish and Lewis, Professional Corporations Revisited (After the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974), 28 TAX LAW. 471 (1975); PALMER'S COMPANY LAW,
supra note 13, at 843-896; REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMM., CMD. 1749, para. 71 [here-




In such a situation, therefore, the court should adopt those
principles which best reflect the aspirations of the members of this
type of business organization, and which best protect the totality
of their interest in such a business organization. The landmark de-
cision in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company of New England
will prove to be of immeasurable assistance in achieving these
objectives. 6
Of course, applying fiduciary standards to small corporations
that have hitherto been applicable to partnerships, is not a pan-
acea. 7 It gives the courts a broad general principle to work with
but, specific details will now have to be etched in with great care.
As the Massachusetts Court pointed out, there is, primarily, the
15. MELVN A. EISENBERG, THE STUC'rURE OF THE CORPORATION 18 (1976): "In formu-
lating a normative model of decision making in the closely held corporation, no considera-
tion of public policy appeared applicable except the protection of fair expectations." The
articulated Donahue fiduciary duty lends assistance to achieving this objective.
16. Justice Wilkins in his concurring opinion agreed that substantially the same fiduci-
ary duty that applies to partners in a partnership applies to shareholders in a close corpora-
tion with respect to share transactions of this type, but did not concur in the application of
this fiduciary duty to all matters in a close corporation. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 604, 328
N.E.2d at 521, (Wilkins, J., concurring):
I agree with much of what the Chief Justice says in support of granting relief to
the plaintiff. However, I do not join in any implication . . . that, the rule con-
cerning a close corporation's purchase of a controlling stockholder's shares ap-
plies to all operations of the corporation as they affect minority stockhold-
ers .... The analogy to partnerships may not be a complete one. (Emphasis
added.)
17. Indeed, one writer perceives it as being potentially dangerous: "The confusion thus
generated by Donahue is potentially dangerous in light of the extreme fiduciary obligation
it imposes upon close corporation shareholders." (Emphasis added.) Note, 21 VILL. L. REv.
307, 315 (1976). Another does not feel entirely comfortable with it:
These two themes, the inadequacy of prior remedies and corporate citizenship,
are developed in the Donahue opinion into the principle that shareholders in a
dose corporation owe each other a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty." Yet
the distinction between this duty and the duty owed by directors and controlling
shareholders in corporations generally-to act in "good faith and with inherent
fairness"-is elusive. The court's exhortation makes it clear that Massachusetts
courts can be expected to supervise more carefully at least some business deci-
sions of close corporations; but which decisions those may be cannot readily be
determined because of the abstract nature of the court's announced principle.
(Emphasis added.)
89 HARv. L. REV. 423, 428 (1975) (footnote omitted). See also, Hetherington & Dooley, Illi-
quidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution To The Remaining Close Corpo-
ration Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977) (footnotes omitted): "Chief Justice Tauro in
Donahue observed that shareholders in close corporations must deal with each other on the
basis of 'the utmost good faith and loyalty' . . . These laudable sentiments seem likely to
enhance the protection of minority shareholders only marginally."
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problem of defining the close corporation. Two factors
predominate. First, the size of the corporation, and second, the
manner in which it functions structurally. In other words, when
deciding whether or not a concern is a close corporation, a court
should be pragmatic, looking at the particular facts and circum-
stances surrounding the size and operation of each corporation.
In Donahue, the court dealt with this problem and after re-
viewing the authorities, concluded: "We deem a close corporation
to be typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready
market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stock-
holder participation in the management, direction and operations
of the corporation.' 8 The court fully accepted that close corpora-
tions "have never been defined precisely,"' 9 but quite rightly ac-
cepted that "the distinctive nature of the close corporation""0 is
well recognized judicially. Thus, the courts will be able to deter-
mine in each individual case whether or not the particular corpora-
tion should or should not be deemed a close corporation. It is a
classic example of looking to substance2 rather than form. The
distinction should be made between a corporation that functions in
a close and commercially intimate manner, much like a partner-
ship, and a corporation that has a relatively small number of
shareholders, but does not function in a mileau of mutual obliga-
tion and trust."2
In the English context, however, the approach of the Chancery
Division of the High Court in Clemens is to be preferred.2 3 In sub-
18. 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511. Comment, 61 IowA L. REV. 876, 881 (1976)
(footnotes omitted):
The court's definition represents a synthesis of the attributes commonly ascribed
by legal writers to the close corporation. This definition of a close corporation
suggests that the facts of Donahue come within the court's definition of a close
corporation as there were only six shareholders, there was no market for the
shares and the Rodds had continually held prominent management positions.
19. 367 Mass. at 586, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
20. Id.
21. E.g., 68th Street Apts., Inc. v. Lauricella, 142 N.J. Super. at 560, 362 A.2d at 86
(Law Div. 1976) (Gaulkin, J.): "Denominating the principals as partners or co-venturers not
only provides an accurate functional description but also appropriately recognizes the mu-
tual rights and obligations which should characterize their relationship."
22. Sufficiently incisive analysis on this basis will obviate the pitfalls apprehended by
this passage: "The Donahue court described the close corporation as having a 'small number
of stockholders'. This description is unfortunately susceptible to an infinite variety of inter-
pretations, and provides Massachusetts corporations with no particular guidelines to deter-
mine whether they fall within the purview of the court's definition of a close corporation".
Note, 21 Vn.L. L. REV. 307, 314 (1976). (footnote omitted).
23. There, the High Court set forth a pragmatic test:
[Vol. 14:3
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stance, the principles applied in Donahue as well as in Clemens
are generically similar. Both approaches are equitable. The differ-
ence is that because of the close corporation genus in the United
States, the Massachusetts court thought it appropriate to establish
a general principle.2 ' Indeed, there is a wealth of precedent dealing
with the fiduciary principles operating internally in partnerships.
This can serve as a guide in developing more well-defined princi-
ples for the internal operations of small companies. Now, however,
if English courts sought to follow Donahue, English law would
pose problems similar to those caused by American law vis-&-vis
the definition of a close corporation. The troubling question is,
however, which companies would be subject to this new set of equi-
table principles, and which would not.
Under English company law, it might appear at first blush
that private companies2 ' would be the appropriate category of
companies to which these principles should apply. Private compa-
nies, however, are no longer limited with respect to the number of
shareholders they may have.26 Thus, under English company law,
the number of shareholders will not be a distinguishing feature by
which companies may be categorized. Since the enactment of the
Companies Act, 1980, there has been a reclassification of compa-
nies. In section 1(1), for example, an essential change is that all
companies which are not public companies shall be private compa-
nies. Thus, some of the companies that would have been public
under the prior law, will now fall into the residuary private cate-
gory. There is therefore no uniform class of companies under En-
glish law that will be the approximate equivalent of the American
I have come to the conclusion that it would be unwise to try to produce a prin-
ciple, since the circumstances of each case are infinitely varied. It would not, I
think, assist to say more than that in my judgment Miss Clemens is not entitled
as of right to exercise her votes as an ordinary shareholder in any way she
pleases. To use the phrase of Lord Wilberforce, that right is 'subject . . . to
equitable considerations... which may make it unjust... to exercise [it] in a
particular way' (emphasis added).
[1976] 2 All. E.R. at 282 (Foster, J.) (footnotes omitted). One commentator observed that-
"it may be that Foster J. in Clemens v. Clemens Bros. Ltd. was pointing a rather unsure
finger in [the] direction [of Donahue]." 92 LAW Q. Rev. 502, 506 (1976).
24. The Donahue decision is the genesis of the fiduciary duty owed by each shareholder
in a close corporation to the other in such a corporation. New Jersey and Florida are the
only other American common law jurisdictions to date that have followed Donahue, and
Maryland has roundly rejected it. See supra note 3.
25. See COMPANiES AcT, 1980, ch. 7, § 1. Under this section some companies that would
have been public under prior law will now fall into the private category.
26. Id. § 1(1).
19831
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
close corporation. There is the problem of the private company
that is, in fact, not run with the same degree of mutual trust and
confidence as a partnership. The same fiduciary duties could not
be applied to such companies without stifling their freedom of op-
eration.2 7 Arguably, in light of this method of operation, no fiduci-
ary duties should automatically exist among the members of these
private companies, if a high degree of mutual trust and confidence
does not predominate. The shareholders must then accept this
method of operation along with the concomitant greater freedom
of discretion allowed the board of directors. Accordingly, the bur-
den of establishing the existence of fiduciary duties would rest
upon those alleging their existence.
Private companies will commit a statutory offense by offering
their shares or debentures to the public.28 This provision, however,
does not support or even suggest that fiduciary duties can lean on
such a slender reed. Consequently, where there is substantial
stockholder participation in the management, direction, and opera-
tion of a private company,"9 the English courts can evaluate the
total picture to determine whether those private companies exhibit
characteristics similar to those of close corporations in the Ameri-
can context. The determination would be substantive and funda-
mental, not superficial. By establishing that those private compa-
nies are subject to substantially the same fiduciary principles that
govern partnerships internally, courts will not be restricted in per-
forming their problem-solving function vis-a-vis dissimilar private
companies.
One commentator has articulated the central issue in Clemens
as "... . whether shareholders are subject to duties which restrict
the use of their votes at general meetings."3 0 Subsequently, the
same commentator accurately summarized general company law
prior to Clemens as follows: "When voting, the shareholder is fully
entitled to take account of his own personal interests and disregard
the .competing interests of other shareholders."' Ultimately, the
27. The absence of mutual trust and confidence in fact would preclude the existence of
fiduciary duties in law.
28. COMPANIZS AcT, 1980, ch. 7, § 15(1).
29. E.g., H.R. Harmer, Ltd. [1958] 3 All E.R. 689; Noted in 22 MOD. L. Rv. 340 (1959);
18 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 37 (1959).
30. 40 MOD. L. REv. 71 (1977).
31. Id. at 72 (footnote omitted). He continued, identifying the well established excep-
tions: "Yet it is equally clear that the courts will intervene to protect a minority's contrac-
tual or proprietary rights, where a resolution seeks to expropriate property of the company,
[Vol. 14:3
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commentator criticized the decision for its application of the com-
monly applied determinative test.32 Had this test been applied in
Clemens, with respect to the usual hypothetical shareholder, the
answer might well have been reversed. For example, if the objec-
tive of the resolutions was for the benefit of such hypothetical
shareholder, the resolutions should have been allowed to stand.
Thus, by asking "[d]id the aunt honestly believe that the
scheme would be for the benefit of the plaintiff?"3 the court de-
parts totally and unequivocally from the hypothetical shareholder
standard and adopts a personified shareholder standard. This de-
parture is only rationally justifiable where a fiduciary duty is owed
by those who proposed and supported the resolution to such per-
sonified shareholder. Thus, for the survival of Clemens, the genetic
nucleus of Donahue must inhere thereto, because without it, the
rational force of the Clemens decision spontaneously disintegrates.
The commentator's criticism is apt and salutary where there is a
unitary set of company law fiduciary principles, identically appli-
cable to public and private companies alike. If, however, there is
fundamental divergence in this respect between the fiduciary du-
ties owed among shareholders in a specific type of private company
in English law, then the criticism is disembodied.
The criticism of Clemens is incontrovertible when each share-
holder in a private company is subject to identical fiduciary duties
(i.e. none). If, however, it is indeed the position in English law that
each shareholder in some private companies does owe the other
fiduciary obligations, then the criticism would be refutable. The
Clemens decision would, therefore, be limited to that specific type
of private company, by virtue of the fiduciary duties peculiar to
those companies.
There are advantages in adopting the Clemens fiduciary duty
principle. The decision provides the courts with more flexibility in
or of the minority, or to permit directors to defraud the company-the cases of 'fraud on
the minority'" (footnote omitted). Id. As he implied, this fact pattern did not come within
the "fraud on the minority" exceptions. Mention should be made at this point of a recent
case that (if its obiter dicta are followed) threatens to reverse the orthodox and heterdox
positions on this point: Prudential Assurance Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No.2) [19801
2 All. E.R. 841; [1980] 3 W.L.R. 543. Noted and (its obiter dicta) criticized in 44 MOD. L.
REv. 202 (1981); 40 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 29 (1981). Also noted in 1980 J. Bus. L. 415; 130 NEw
L.J. 392 (1980). See also Burridge, Wrongful Rights Issues, 44 MoD. L. REv. 40 (1981).
32. The commentator noted that the court looked at "whether the resolution was
passed 'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole'" Supra note 30, at 72.
33. [1976] 2 All. E.R. 268, 281 (emphasis added).
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solving the myriad problems resulting from the stress and strain of
operating that type of private company. It also complements the
provisions of the Companies Act, 1980, which apply specifically to
the area of unfair prejudice to stockholders in English companies.
If one considers other possible solutions, one must note that
English company law provides the "remedy" of winding up, when
company affairs are conducted in a manner oppressive"' to some of
the members of such company. The petitioner, however, must
shoulder the burden of proof that the oppression is of such inten-
sity that it is just and equitable to wind up the company."s More-
over, after a careful and thoughtful analysis of this remedy in light
of its full consideration by the House of Lords in a recent case, 36
one author lamented: "[It is regrettable that an aggrieved minor-
ity member of a small private company should have to think of
winding up as one of his major remedies. Its subtlety as a form of
cure for ailing companies is that of a sledge-hammer. . . Finally,
he concluded: "In the meantime, the only justification for keeping
alive the sledge-hammer remedy of section 222(f) in this particular
context is that frequently nothing else is available. When other
more flexible remedies are subjected to appropriate reform, the
sledge-hammer need only be used where euthanasia is utterly
essential.""
Winding up is still a rather final solution. A corporation may
be functioning profitably and its members may be able to continue
its profitable operation if a particular dispute is effectively settled.
In such situations, to wind up the company might, at best, be the
least of several evils, rather than the best solution. Application of
the fiduciary duty standard among shareholders in that specific
type of private company could quite conceivably provide the
framework to generate alternative solutions, from which the court
could select the most appropriate.3 9
34. Oppressive is defined as conduct that is "burdensome, harsh, and wrongful," by
Lord Simonds in Scottish C.W.S. Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324, 342, quoted in 17 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 152 (1958). See PALMER'S COMPANY LAW, supra note 13, at 514.
35. COMPANIES ACT, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 222(f); Ebrahimi v. Westbourne
Galleries Ltd., [19731 A.C. 360, thoroughly discussed in Chesterman, The "Just and Equi-
table" Winding Up of Small Private Companies, 36 MOn. L. REV. 129 (1973); noted in 88
LAW Q. REV. 468; L. GOWER, supra note 13, at 596-604.
36. Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360.
37. Chesterman, supra note 35, at 149-50.
38. Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).
39. Such fiduciary duty would, it is submitted, be one of the "...more appropriate
surgical instruments [available to the courts] when confronted with the typical grievances of
[Vol. 14:3
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The new "alternative remedy," section 75 of the Companies
Act, 1980, provides English courts with statutory power to fashion
a remedy. Thus, the legislature has eliminated the most serious ob-
stacle to invoking this remedy which existed under section 210 of
the 1948 Act. Under the prior law "The problems posed by the
section [tended] to divide themselves into two: (i) the preliminary
hurdles to relief; and (ii) the meaning of 'oppression'."4 0 However,
at least one preliminary hurdle still confronts a petitioner. He
must prove that his petition is presented in the capacity of a com-
pany member."1 Admittedly, under the provisions of section 75(9),
minority members of small private companies." Id. at 150.
40. Note, 29 MOD. L. REV. 321 (1966).
41. Bellador Silk Ltd., [19651 1 All E.R. 667; Lundie Brothers, Ltd., [1965] 2 All E.R.
692. Both noted in 29 MOn. L. REV. 321 (1966). The petitioner must be oppressed in his
capacity as shareholder. An oppressed director, debentureholder or other creditor who is
also a shareholder is outside the protection of the section if the oppression is not in his
capacity as shareholder. L. GOWER, supra note 13, at 600-602. The South Carolina provi-
sions could usefully serve as a model for legislative amendment in England. It enacts at S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-21-150 (1976):
Dissolution pursuant to court order.-The courts of this State shall have full
power to decree the dissolution of, and to liquidate the assets and business of, a
corporation:
(a) In an action filed by a shareholder, when it is established that:
(1) The directors of the corporation are so divided respecting the management of
the corporation's business and affairs that the votes required for action by the
board of directors cannot be obtained and the shareholders are unable to termi-
nate the division, with the consequence that (A) the corporation is suffering or
will suffer irreparable injury, or (B) the business and affairs of the corporation
can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally.
(2) The shareholders are so divided that they have failed, for a period which
includes at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to
directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the qualification
of their successors.
(3) The shareholders are so divided respecting the management of the business
and affairs of the corporation that (A) the corporation is suffering or will suffer
irreparable injury, or (B) the business and affairs of the corporation can no
longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders generally.
(4) The acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation (A) are ille-
gal or fraudulent or dishonest, or (B) are oppressive or unfairly prejudicial
either to the corporation or to any shareholder whether in his capacity as a
shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation.
(5) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
(6) The petitioning shareholder has a right under a provision of the articles of
incorporation as permitted by § 33-21-140 to dissolution of the corporation at
will or upon the occurrence of any specified event or contingency.
(7) The corporation has abandoned its business and has failed, within a reasona-
ble time, to take steps to dissolve and liquidate its affairs and distribute its
assets.
(b) In an action filed by a creditor of the corporation; (1) When the claim of the
creditor has been reduced to judgment and execution thereon returned unsatis-
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personal representatives and trustees in bankruptcy are empow-
ered to petition as well, but perhaps this does not go far enough.
Section 75(2) allows the secretary of state to petition in specified
circumstances, and this may provide a circuitous route for persons
other than members, or members in a non-member capacity.
Fortunately, the petitioner is no longer required to prove that
the situation necessitates the company's winding up on the just
and equitable criteria,'2 that winding up the company would un-
fairly prejudice the rights of some company members, including
the petitioner, and that an alternative remedy is available." Sec-
fled and it is established that the corporation is insolvent; or
(2) When the corporation has admitted in writing that the claim of the creditor
is due and owing and it is established that the corporation is insolvent.
(c) Upon application by a corporation which has filed a statement of intent to
dissolve, as provided in Chapters 1 to 25 of this Title, to have its liquidation
continued under the supervision of the court.
(d) When an action has been filed by the Attorney General to dissolve a corpora-
tion and it is established that liquidation of its business and affairs should pre-
cede the entry of a decree of dissolution.
(e) Proceedings under subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section shall be brought
in the county in which the registered office or the principal office of the corpora-
tion is located.
(f) In determining whether dissolution shall be ordered on petition of a share-
holder under subsection (a), dissolution shall not be denied solely because it is
found that the business of the corporation has been or could be conducted at a
profit (emphasis added).
The section was interpreted and applied in Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, 236 S.E.2d 316
(1977). In the view of one commentator: "The South Carolina statute makes several im-
provements upon the section 210 Model and thus offers effective protection to minorities."
Afterman, Statutory Profection For Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model For Re-
form, 55 VA. L. REv. 1043, 1075 (1969).
42. COMPANIES ACT, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 210(2)(b), repealed by COMPANIES
ACT, 1980, ch. 22.
43. See Scottish C.W.S. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 W.L.R. 404; H.R. Harmer, Ltd., 11959] 1
W.L.R. 62. The new provisions confer wider powers on the court and compare more favora-
bly with the South Carolina statute which provides:
§ 33-21-155 Discretion of court to grant relief other than dissolution.
(a) In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation on the
grounds enumerated in § 33-21-150 the court may make such order or grant such
relief, other than dissolution, as in its discretion it deems appropriate, including
without limitation, an order
(1) Cancelling or altering any provision contained in the articles of incor-
poration, or any amendment thereof, or in the bylaws of the corporation;
(2) Cancelling, altering or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation;
(3) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders,
directors, officers or other persons party to the action; or
(4) Providing for the purchase at their fair value of shares of any share-
holder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders.
(b) Such relief may be granted as an alternative to a decree of dissolution, or
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tion 75 of the Companies Act, 1980, has removed these formidable
preliminary hurdles.
The new provisions provide relief from "unfairly prejudicial
conduct" rather than "oppression" under the prior law. The House
of Lord's definition of oppression was difficult to overcome." It re-
quired a course of conduct; therefore, a single instance of burden-
some, harsh, and wrongful conduct did not suffice. " One commen-
tator observed that "section 210 provides no criteria for assessing
when the affairs of the company are being oppressively con-
ducted .. . ,,. In practice, the section had not worked well. The
recent failures4 7 of petitions presented under this section provided
may be granted whenever the circumstances of the case are such that relief, but
not dissolution, would be appropriate (emphasis added).
In South Carolina, the alternative remedy the petitioner seeks need not necessarily be spe-
cifically identified by him. Proof of sufficient grounds for winding up the corporation, in
addition to proof that to do so would unfairly prejudice the interests of some members,
(including the petitioner), are not conditions precedent to action by the court to grant an
alternative remedy. The whole matter rests in the discretion of the court.
44. Indeed, only in Scottish C.W.S. v. Meyer, supra note 43, and in H.R. Harmer, Ltd.,
supra note 43, was "oppression" proved. In a third case, Jermyn Street Turkish Baths, Ltd.,
[1970] 1 W.L.R. 1194, the petitioner was initially successful, but the decision was reversed
on appeal, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1042, and petition for leave to appeal to the House of Lords was
dismissed. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1286.
45. The Jenkins Report had recommended that a single occurrence of oppressive con-
duct should be enough. REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, CMD. 1749, para. 212(b).
The English legislature has now enacted this recommendation in section 75, as did the
Jamaican legislature earlier in the JAMAICA COMPANIES ACT OF 1965, § 196(6) which provides:
"(6) For the purposes of this section the word 'oppressive' shall include any instance of
oppression whether constituted by a single act or by a course of conduct." See generally
Leacock, Company Law Reform in Jamaica, 1975 J. Bus. L. 252.
46. Rajak, The Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 35 MOD. L. REv. 156, 162 (1972).
Professor Rajak continues:
The tension in the law is created, it is submitted, by the democratic process
which ex hypothesi implies the existence of a dissenting minority, whose reasons
for dissent may be sensible and valid. The lot of the minority is not merely that
others have expressed a different view but that it is required to embrace that
view. Yet to allow otherwise constitutes the radical step of flouting the majority
vote, made all the more grave by the fact that it is taken by a judiciary with a
self-professed ignorance in matters of business. It can therefore be appeciated
that very strong justification is necessary for oppression de facto to be declared
to be oppression de jure. It is at that point that conduct becomes "harsh, bur-
densome and wrongful" or contains "an element of lack of probity and fair deal-
ing" or constitutes "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealings and a
violation of the conditions of fair play" or in short "oppressive".
Id. at 162-63 (footnote omitted).
47. Bellador Silk Ltd., supra note 41, Lundie Brothers, Ltd., supra note 41; Five Min-
ute Car Wash Service Ltd., [19661 1 All E.R. 242; all noted in 29 MoD. L. REv. 321 (1966).
In contrast, in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the Donahue fiduciary princi-
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fresh proof4 s of its hazardous technical maze.
In contrast, unfairly prejudicial conduct should not be as for-
midable an obstacle as oppression was under the prior law. If a
shareholder can show that he is treated less favorably than another
shareholder similarly situated, then, arguably, there is prejudicial
conduct. Such conduct is unfair if the petitioner can show that
there is no reasonable basis for such treatment, allowing the courts
to apply the familiar "reasonable person in the circumstances"
test. The change is one of degree rather than genus, and most
likely, the conduct in at least some of the recent cases would have
met the new standard. In addition, a single instance of unfairly
prejudicial conduct would violate the new provisions because they
state "or that any actual or proposed act or omission of the com-
pany. . . is or would be so prejudicial.'1 This closes a serious la-
cuna that existed under the prior provisions.
The new provisions are salutary and long overdue, but they do
not obviate the need for the Clemens standard. Mutual trust, obli-
gation, and vulnerability are pervasive in small private companies
and require relentless and supreme" duties beyond those applica-
ble to companies in general (whether private or public). It will be
somewhat easier to prove breach of a fiduciary duty of the utmost
good faith and loyalty, than to prove that particular conduct is un-
fairly prejudicial or, a fortiori, that the conduct justifies a just and
equitable winding up. The Clemens decision augments the control-
ling shareholders' statutory negative obligation"' by adding a posi-
tive obligation."
Alternatively, fiduciary duties owed among shareholders in a
private company (or even a public company) could conceivably be
ple and held that the minority shareholder plaintiff was entitled to damages because major-
ity shareholders in the close corporation had not shown a legitimate business purpose for
removing him from the payroll of the corporation, and refusing to re-elect him as a salaried
officer and director. The corporation had never paid dividends.
48. As Professor Rajak, supra note 47, at 169 stated: "[s]ection 210 was a bold but, it is
submitted, unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the position of minority shareholders. The
need for a jurisdicton as offered by that section is undoubted, but bold, enlightened and
supported initiative is needed to make it a reality."
49. COMPANIES ACT, 1980, ch. 7, § 75(l).
50. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 468, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (1928).
51. An example of a negative statutory obligation is not to conduct the affairs of the
company "in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some part of the
members." See COMPANIES ACT, 1980, ch. 7, § 75(1).
52. An example of a positive statutory obligation is to act towards the minority share-
holders with the utmost good faith, fairness and loyalty.
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created by the articles of association.8 These, when registered with
the registrar of companies, bind the company and its shareholders
to observe all their provisions as if each had contracted to this ef-
fect."' Therefore, an article worded: "Every person on becoming a
member of this company shall upon becoming such a member owe
fiduciary duties of the utmost good faith and loyalty to each and
every other member of this company" could, by virtue of the statu-
tory contract created by section 20 of the Companies Act, 1948,
achieve for such company the same objective as the Clemens and
Donahue decisions.
This notion is premised upon:
the rather heterodox proposition"' that a shareholder has not
merely particular rights under the Articles of Association, but a
general contractual right to have the articles observed by the
company; and that this right extends to the enforcement by in-
junction or declaration of "outsider-rights", which the articles
purport to bestow upon himself or upon others, provided always
that he makes out his case qua member and does not appear in
the capacity of "outsider". .. "
This concept also rests upon orthodox English company law princi-
ples on this point,67 because the fiduciary duty as articulated
would be owed to each member qua member.
In practice, however, this solution presents a minority share-
holder with the insuperable difficulty of persuading sufficient other
members to insert such a provision into the articles, either origi-
nally, or by amendment." In any event, the Clemens decision and
the previously discussed provisions of the Companies Act, 1980,
have perhaps, eliminated much of the doubt regarding the efficacy
of English company law in solving small company conflicts which
53. Legislation is another possible, but seemingly unlikely method of creating fiduciary
duties among shareholders.
54. See COMPANIES AcT, 1948, ch. 7, § 20.
55. The question might now be how far apart are the hetorodox proposition and the
orthodox principles of company law on this point. It is submitted that the divergence is one
of parameters and not of fundamental principle. See Bamford v. Bamford, [1969] 1 All E.R.
969; affirming 119681 2 All. E.R. 655; noted in 31 MoD. L. REv. 688 (1968); Hogg v.
Cramphorn Ltd., [1966] 3 All E.R. 420; 30 MOD. L. REv. 77 (1967). See also Richmond Gate
Property Co. Ltd., [1964] 3 All E.R. 936; 28 MOD. L. REv. 347 (1965). Cf. 29 MoD. L. REv.
608 (1966); Gower, supra note 13, at 261-65.
56. Note, 18 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 37, 40 (1959).
57. Id.
58. Under COMPANIES AcT, 1948, § 23.
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arise. 9
Arguably, limiting this fiduciary duty exclusively to a particu-
lar type of private company may be criticized as being too restric-
tive. One may ask whether it is conceivable that the court will ever
hold that the acts of shareholders of a public company are in
breach of equitable principles which will justify court action to
provide a remedy for affected shareholders. Most likely, one must
answer in the affirmative.
The approach of Judge Foster in Clemens is unassailable when
such problems arise in public companies."0 If the public company
is sufficiently similar to a private company or close corporation,
then in light of the particular facts it is appropriate to apply equi-
table principles to provide an effective solution to the problem. It
would, indeed, be difficult to argue convincingly, that the general
principle articulated by the Massachusetts court should be applied
to all public companies.61
First, shareholders in public companies in both the United
States and England usually have access to public markets for the
purchase and sale of their securities. Further, in England, there is
no statutory offense for making offers or sales of the securities of
public companies to the public as there is with respect to private
companies."2 Therefore, shareholders who are negatively affected
by internal action in a public company can readily dispose of their
shares and thereby avoid further detriment.s
Second, a small number of shareholders is not a projected
norm for public companies. Indeed, the objective in creating a pub-
lic company is usually to gain access to capital from the public at
59. L. GOWER, supra note 13, at 596-604.
60. Donahue, 367 Mass. at 585, 328 N.E.2d at 511. "[W]e limit the applicability of our
holdings to "close corporations" . . . Whether the holding should apply to other corpora-
tions is left for decision in another case, on a proper record." Therefore, the prospect of
applying these principles to a non-close corporation in appropriate circumstances, is thus,
not ruled out. Id.
61. See Close Corporations-Rights and Duties of Shareholders: Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Company of New England, Inc., 61 CORNELL L. REv. 986, 1016 (1976). See also
Comment, The Standard of Fiduciary Duty in a Close Corporation, 61 IowA L. REV. 876,
895-96 (1976).
62. COMPANIES ACT, 1980, ch. 7, § 15(1).
63. The price such shareholders may receive is not always as good as they would prefer,
but at least, the possibility for sale is there. Besides, the protection afforded minority share-
holders in public companies in both the United States and England, by the "fraud on mi-
nority" concept is, reasonably satisfactory. See H. G. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONs 475-82
(1970); L. GOWER, supra note 13, at 564-580, and the cases there cited.
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large. Infinity, rather than smallness in the number of members, is
the preferred goal.
Third, the coincidence of functions between shareholders, on
the one hand, and directors, managers, and operational personnel,
on the other, is not the usual situation in a public company. This
structure tends to permeate the typical close corporation and cer-
tain types of private companies. In public companies, however,
there tends to be the opposite situation. Distinct separation be-
tween share ownership and management functioning is the norm.
There does exist a more or less standardized model of corporate
decision making-what we call the received model-whose gen-
eral outlines are well known . . . Under [this] model, however,
no one acts as agents of the shareholders . . . the officers are
agents of the board ... [which] is conceived to be an indepen-
dent institution, not directly responsible to shareholders in the
matter of an agent.6
Hence, with respect to the management of public companies,
the shareholders do not operate in a mileau of mutual confidence,
trust, and obligation. Essentially, they do not manage the corpora-
tion at all. By virtue of detailed provisions in the articles of associ-
ation and the operation of the proxy machinery by management,
shareholders often tend to be quiescent and entirely dependent on
the business managers of the corporation. In the United States:
". .. [Glenerally speaking, shareholders in publicly held corpora-
tions are not presently entitled to vote on business decisions in any
event. .. "" and in England: "The modern rule. . . is that under
an article in the terms of table A the members in general meeting
cannot give directions on how the company's affairs are to be man-
aged, nor can they overrule any decision come to by the directors
in the conduct of its business."6 Therefore, the substratum of
components on which the Donahue fiduciary duty rests is absent
in publicly held companies negating any rational basis for an argu-
ment which would support its extension to such companies.
Finally, now that the Massachusetts Supreme Court has taken
the plunge in the United States, and the Clemens court in Eng-
64. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corpo-
rate Decision Making, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1969). See also R. NADER, M. GREEN, J. SELIG-
MAN, Constitutionalizing the Corporation: The Case For Federal Chartering of Giant Cor-
porations, ch. IV (1976).
65. M. EISENBERG, THE STUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, 28 (1976).
66. L. GowEn, supra note 13, at 132.
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land, it will be easier for subsequent courts in both countries to
follow suit. Establishing such fundamental principles is not rash,
extreme, nor overbroad, despite the significantly dissimilar compa-
nies to which these decisions will apply in their respective jurisdic-
tions. Admittedly, this solution may not be the corporate promised
land. It fails to decide the fundamental question: should the will of
the majority in a close corporation in the United States, and in
some private companies in England, sometimes prevail when the
minority may suffer? Most likely, the prior prevailing view
67 will
continue to dominate. One crucial issue, however, remains un-
resolved. What degree of suffering must the minority endure
before the court will intervene? In other words, how much control
can the majority exercise without breaching its fiduciary duty?
Courts will undoubtedly continue to answer this question with
the typical response that the majority can exercise an appropriate
degree of control. As a result of both Donahue and Clemens, how-
ever, courts will engage in stricter scrutiny of majority action. Cer-
tainly, penumbral areas must lie ahead. Future courts, however,
will be capable of providing the necessary illumination as such ar-
eas become apparent. Most likely, judicial osmosis will complete
the process of absorption.
67. Which is Yes, if they are pursuing a sufficiently significant legitimate business ob-
jective which outweighs (from the complaining shareholder's point of view) the negative
impact on the complaining shareholder. In Donahue there was no legitimate business objec-
tive. The goal of the scheme seemed to be to provide liquidity for the retiring Harry C.
Rodd.
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